Chloé de Canson


I am a PhD student in the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method at the London School of Economics. I work primarily on philosophy of probability, including Bayesian epistemology and probabilities in physics. I am also very interested in some aspects of philosophy of language and metaphysics, and their intersection with the philosophy of probability. In 2017/2018, together with Joe Roussos, I am organising a feminism reading group.

Previously, I read the MPhil Philosophy in the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge (2015-2016), and the BSc Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method here at LSE (2012-2015).

My e-mail address is c.de-canson@lse.ac.uk. Here is a copy of my CV. I also have a profile on academia.edu. Finally, I want to thank Aron Vallinder for his website template.

Some upcoming talks.

  • The Paradox of the Two Envelopes

    In this paper, I propose a solution to the paradox of the two envelopes. I argue that issues surrounding designation are at the heart of the problem, and that this has important implications for decision theory. [handout]

    • 1. London-Berkeley Graduate Conference in Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley (05-06 May 2017)
    • 2. Workshop on Philosophy of Language for Decision Theory, London School of Economics (25-26 May 2017) [website]
  • The Method of Arbitrary Functions

    There is widespread excitement in the literature about the method of arbitrary functions: many believe that it might provide a novel objective basis for non-trivial probabilities against a background of determinism. In this paper, I argue that it cannot. [handout]

    • 1. Workshop on Probability, Determinism, and Agency, London School of Economics (19 May 2017) [website]
    • 2. Conference on Reasoning and Argumentation in Science, Center for Advanced Studies, LMU Munich (31 May-02 June 2017) [website]
    • 3. Conference of the Society for the Metaphysics of Science, Fordham University, New York City (05-07 October 2017) [website]
  • Bayesian Formulations of the Problem(s) of Induction

    In this paper, I use tools of Bayesianism to distinguish between three versions of the problem of induction. I argue that one such version is identical to the problem of the priors, and that another is essentially a problem of choice of underlying algebra.

    • 1. Ninth European Congress of Analytic Philosophy, LMU Munich (21-26 August 2017) [website]

Como, Italy.